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Abstract: Managing risk is usually multi-dimensional and frequently controversial, since a focus on one 
element may lead to outcomes that are unpopular with other stakeholders, who may have different 
agendas, objectives or motivations. This requires that judgements be made, which in many situations 
require expertise, which is hard won and specific.  In some cases, however, the role of experts has been 
controversial, with other stakeholders challenging the basis on which decisions are made.  In other 
instances management systems or standard operating procedures may hamper discretion.  Effective risk 
management requires that the correct expertise is identified, recruited or developed and sufficiently 
supported by management practice, including training.  It is important, but frequently challenging, to 
demonstrate that this is undertaken in a reasonable and defendable manner.  The paper draws together a 
number of different concepts and evaluates their impact on the design of robust policy positions that may 
address the concerns that urban stakeholders may have in developing an appropriate and proportionate 
response to risks. 
Keywords: Risk management, dynamic risk, expertise, stakeholders. 
 
1. Introduction. 
Perhaps the single most defining thing about cities is that they have lot of people in them and there is a lot 
going on!  In other words they are complex places where different groups or individuals pursue an almost 
infinite number of aims and objectives, and value all sorts of things very differently as a result.  Urban life 
has also facilitated the development of many roles and professions, some of which are concerned with the 
management of different types of risk.  Strategic risk management requires that these different agendas be 
reconciled and that the most relevant expertise be efficiently deployed to make sustainable judgements 
that people will adhere to.  It is not always the case that this happens in practice, and one case that has 
been widely discussed is the apparent shift in the balance of decision making from public service 
professionals to health and safety practitioners.  This is by no means the only such case that might be 
examined (others that have been discussed include the border control and immigration policy influence on 
education (Morgan, 2015; Chandler, 2004), effects of regulation on the financial sector (Nicholls et al., 
2011) and environmental laws hindering competiveness for example (Blind, 2012)).  The main common 
feature is the criticism of the enactment of some policy, initially conceived for logical and well intentioned 
reasons, but which has either had unintended consequences or extended beyond its original scope.  It is 
this enactment of well-intentioned health and safety policies that this paper will examine.  The issue that 
will be examined is the real world fact that trade-offs and judgements need to be made: 
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Regulators frequently talk about the need to provide ‘proper’ protection, to avoid ‘excessive’ risk 
aversion and to ‘balance’ benefits and risks.  But these terms are undefined, value laden and 
mean different things to different people (Haythornthwaite, 2006) 
This incorporation of values is fundamental to successful risk management. Kates et al. (1985) actually 
incorporated the concept of value in their definition of risk as: 
‘an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to something that humans 
value’ (Kates et al. 1985: 21). 
This social definition of risk is helpful in the current context since risk is usually assessed in terms of the 
probability and severity of the consequences of an event, and these consequences can be positive or 
negative, depending on the values that people associate with them (IRGC, 2005).  It should be remembered 
that risks are not taken for their own sake but in pursuit of some benefit and the values placed on both risk 
and benefit are sources of disagreement among stakeholders.  Strategic risk management, including the 
development of policy for urban risk management, needs to address both evidence and values and to 
reconcile disputes about who should make the decisions. 
The main argument developed is that many situations require expertise, which is hard won and context 
specific.  Effective risk management requires that the correct expertise is identified, recruited or developed 
and sufficiently supported by management practice, including training.  It is important, but frequently 
challenging, to demonstrate that this is undertaken in a reasonable and defendable manner.  The paper 
draws together a number of different concepts and evaluates their impact on the design of robust policy 
positions that may address the concerns that urban stakeholders may have in developing an appropriate 
and proportionate response to risks.   It builds on the concept, first set out in the early 1980s in the USA 
(NRC, 1983), that the process of risk management should be separated from the process of risk assessment 
– i.e. that policy making be separated from evidence gathering, in order to permit the scrutiny of the data 
against societal values. 
2. Risk assessment 
In the UK the framing legislation for safety, the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, requires that 
employers do what is ‘reasonably practicable’ to ensure the safety of workers and others.   The concept of 
reasonable practicability is an indication that safety investment decisions need to include a consideration of 
the economic costs when judging the effectiveness of the proposed intervention. The duty holder has a 
duty to do what is reasonable but is not required to do everything possible. Several subsequent regulations 
have required  that employers undertake ‘suitable and sufficient’ risk assessments and therefore the 
requirement for formal, frequently written, risk assessments has proliferated over a number of years driven 
by the requirement to demonstrate, to regulators and in court, that organisations have acted reasonably.   
Unsurprisingly a number of risk assessment techniques and safety management systems have been 
developed, initially in high risk occupational settings but increasingly becoming prevalent elsewhere and 
this has impacts upon urban environments and the public.   Such techniques assess the likelihood and 
severity of a risk event and facilitate evaluation of the requirement to mitigate the risk against an economic 
calculation that essentially identifies the sole benefit of an intervention being the increase in safety that 
can be balanced against the cost of implementing the action – i.e. the test of reasonable practicability.  In 
the UK, organisations with five or more employees are required to provide a written risk assessment of 
work activities (Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations, 1999).  There is an emerging 
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concern that such approaches to the management of safety have spread outside their traditional workplace 
application, including to the management of urban public spaces. Ball and Ball-King (2011) point out that, 
even where a relatively simple form of risk assessment is utilised for evaluation of risk, some ‘feelings of 
unease’ may arise because: 
…risks in public life are not actually that simple.  They are not just about ‘things’ or ‘hazards’, 
natural or manufactured, as is conceivably more nearly the case in the workplace, but more 
about interactions between people, objects and environmental conditions. A proper risk 
assessment of canals and waterways, historic buildings statues in city squares, cobbled streets, 
shade giving trees, car boot sales and the like, would need to factor in knowledge of people, 
with all their behaviours, and the weather, notable for its vagaries. 
There is clearly a tension between requirements for policies to manage risk proportionately, incorporate 
stakeholder values where appropriate, be available for scrutiny and another requirement to be able to 
react to changing circumstances.   
Such tensions may be especially acute in the provision of emergency services, such as police, ambulance 
and fire fighting, where officers sometimes have to work in very dangerous and dynamic operational 
environments.  In addition the general public may expect these operators to put themselves at risk to 
protect others – so the authorities, unions and professional bodies face a considerable challenge in 
applying the law as it was outlined earlier.  As the Chief Fire Officers Association (CFOA, 2013) say for 
example: 
‘We expect firefighters and officers to respond in a professional manner to all emergency 
incidents. We believe that health and safety regulation and subsequent guidance should be 
mindful of the unique challenges presented by emergency response and therefore 
proportionate in their application. Training and operational procedures are vitally important 
but CFOA does not believe it is possible to risk assess and train for every possible scenario that 
a firefighter or officer might face. CFOA therefore supports the use of generic risk assessments 
supported by risk awareness and dynamic assessment along with the safe person concept; right 
person in the right place, at the right time with appropriate training, equipment and 
procedures. We recognise that decisions will need to be made in emergency and dynamic 
situations that with the benefit of a 20/20 hindsight investigation may not bear scrutiny and 
question‘.  
The ‘safe person’ concept has two aspects, organisational responsibility and individual responsibility 
(Ponting, 2008), but is essentially a recognition that risk management needs to rely on expertise at the time 
that the decision is made and the management of risk needs to be carried out ‘instinctively and 
continuously during the task itself, rather than being a formal procedure completed before the task begins’ 
(Tissington and Flin, 2005). This requires that experienced individuals are empowered to make judgements 
as the situation unfolds.  The organisational responsibility is to ensure that the person making the decision 
has the expertise and that the service can demonstrate a suitable integration into risk management policy 
covering other aspects such as equipment, training, safe systems of work.   Done well, this combination of 
prior written risk assessment and provision of well-considered approaches to managing risk in dynamic 
situations, including learning from experience should be sufficient to address the tension outlined above.  
There are obvious lessons for others who need to deal with volatile situations (lone working, site visits, 
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inspections etc.) by public employees.  Thus it should be possible to avoid loss of important activities and 
services through risk aversion, perhaps induced by fear of prosecution. 
2. Expertise. 
Having argued that there is a role for expertise in the efficient management of a number of areas of risk, it 
immediately becomes apparent that it is important to consider the type of expertise required.  In the fire 
fighting example considered above what was being discussed was the ability of experts in fire fighting (or 
managing fire-grounds) to keep their own staff and the public as safe as reasonably practicable.  In a 
practical sense, they have been given a mandate to do this – and in fact the concept of mandate can be 
used to determine who is in charge at an emergency, which can be extremely useful in ensuring coherent 
organisation.   Guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) in the UK (HM Government, 
2013), for example, states that the police will normally co-ordinate the activities at and around the scene of 
a land base emergency. However, a fire and rescue authority would co-ordinate the response at the scene 
for a major fire at least until the fire has been made safe, at which point the police would ensure the scene 
is preserved, so as to safeguard evidence.  
This concept of mandate is a useful one in the consideration of a number of potentially troublesome 
aspects of urban risk management, where stakeholder values conflict.  Suitable expertise is required to be 
deployed in development of sustainable solutions that set a level of risk acceptable to different groups.  In 
other papers in this conference we discuss some of the impacts that can happen if a single voice, say, 
health and safety, becomes too dominant.  In the play sector, for example, Ball and Sandseter (2016), 
evaluate the impact on children if play provision becomes overly risk averse.  A revealing discussion, based 
in part on (Speigal et al., 2014), finds this: 
   ‘ …… Standards have invaded areas of decision making beyond their legitimate territory with 
the consequence that play provision has skewed away from what are properly play provision 
objectives. It is suggested that a consequence has been that local decision makers are often 
disempowered, with their ability to provide optimal play spaces thereby circumscribed’. 
A similar pattern emerged in the discussion of the management of the risk to the public from falling trees 
(Ball, Watt and Fay, 2016), where a disproportionate emphasis on one aspect of risk management, highway 
engineering, led to suggested solutions that threatened the achievement of other benefits of urban trees.  
In both situations, and others such as adventure sports, over enthusiastic pursuit of a risk minimisation 
agenda, has begun to be countered by recruitment of expertise from within the respective sectors where, 
arguably, the true expertise resides. 
3. Relevance of expertise 
Clearly at least one dimension of the problem is the identification of expertise that is relevant to the issue 
(in itself a source of possible contention), along with the associated issue of developing a mechanism for 
the incorporation of values into the risk decision making.  One problem is that expertise itself may have lost 
credibility, perhaps due in part to the very controversies being addressed.  In the UK the field of health and 
safety came under such sustained public ridicule for excessive ‘nannying’ of the population, that the 
regulator was forced to make series of statements about what constituted ‘sensible risk management’ 
(Callaghan, 2006) and introduced a ‘myth of the  month’ feature on its website to fight back.  Many of the 
stories that contributed to this attack were in fact rooted in some aspect of public life, such as village fetes, 
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concerts and classrooms – and these are areas where the general public feels very much at home and 
therefore willing to dispute any perceived heavy handed safety intervention.  
In fact, of course, the public is perfectly correct to believe that it has expertise in such areas.  Parents know 
a lot about bringing up children for example.  A current model of expertise developed by psychologists is 
that an expert is somebody who has spent about 10,000 hours self-consciously developing their expertise.  
Harry Collins (2014) discusses what he terms ‘ubiquitous expertise’ – acquired without necessarily putting 
in any self-conscious effort simply by growing up in a particular society (speaking one’s native language is 
not seen as an expertise by one’s countrymen but clearly is when viewed by a foreigner).  Acquisition of 
such expertise is an achievement which happens to be learnt without much apparent effort.  Being a 
citizen, therefore, can be seen as being somebody that actually knows quite a lot that is relevant to 
knowing, say, why trees are valuable on a city street, why children need to take risks to learn and grow, and 
what benefits may be obtained from adventure sports.   
There are, however, a number of difficulties.  Firstly, as with a lot of expertise, a great deal of the 
knowledge is tacit – people ‘know’ what should happen but find it hard to express how they know (‘That’s 
just how it is’).  Secondly the situation may actually call for specialist expertise because there are qualities 
to be assessed that go beyond what a non-specialist would be in a position to achieve.  Notice that in no 
sense should this be expressed as ‘real’ expertise since some types of expertise may change over time from 
specialist to (near) ubiquitous (Collins, 2014).  Driving a car is one example that demonstrated this shift.  
Specialists are people who, through study and practice, have developed an expertise that is not (yet) 
common in the general population and who may have important contributions to make in gathering 
evidence needed to assess or evaluate a risk.  Specialists in this sense may be what most people mean 
when they talk about expertise.  A third difficulty, deciding which type of expertise is actually useful may be 
addressed by another type of expertise identified by Collins (2014) – meta-expertise, used to evaluate and 
select between other experts.   
4. Meta analysis of expertise 
One way to examine the role of technical expertise in risk management decision making is to examine some 
fundamental aspects of the risk itself (IRGC, 2008).  Relatively simple risks are those where a lot is known 
already and, although the risks may be considerable, such as when managing fires, there may be existing 
regulation, codes of practice and, crucially specialists are available.  In such areas the benefits of taking 
action may be straightforward and uncontroversial. A different approach to risk evaluation and governance 
may be needed where risks are increasingly complex, uncertain and/or ambiguous (with respect to the 
perceptions and values associated with the risks). Complexity refers to difficulties in identifying and 
quantifying causal links between agents and effects (e.g. failures of large interconnected infrastructure). 
Complex risks require recruitment of a wider range of expertise to develop a ‘risk-informed’ and 
‘robustness-focussed’ strategy.  If uncertainty is high, there is insufficient clarity or quality of the scientific 
or technical data (e.g. new technologies, some natural disasters, terrorism). Uncertain risks are better 
managed using ‘precaution-based’ and ‘resilience-focussed’ strategies. Ambiguity results from divergent or 
contested perspectives (from different stakeholders, including the public) and the appropriate approach 
comprises a ‘discourse-based’ strategy which sets out to create tolerance and mutual understanding of 
conflicting views and values with a view to eventually reconciling them. 
It will be clear that the cases under discussion have been selected to focus on the importance of expertise 
in risk management decision making but that the situations outlined are rather different.  In some cases it is 
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clear that relevant expertise exists and the difficulty is mainly on devising a system where suitable experts 
may be identified and then supported to get on with their job.   It may seem odd to refer to fighting a fire 
or managing a school trip or to go rock climbing or caving as ‘simple’ but, as set out above, it does seem 
appropriate to delegate management to an expert.  In fact it seems perverse to do otherwise.  Care may 
need to be taken by the responsible organisation (e.g. a school) to ensure that sensible steps have been 
taken to identify, recruit or develop the appropriate level of specialist expertise and that this process has 
been adequately recorded so that it may be later scrutinised if something does go wrong.  The duty of the 
responsible organisation is to do what is ‘reasonably practicable’ to ensure safety and the written policy 
should demonstrate that if required to do so.  That does not mean writing detailed procedures for every 
possible outcome, or hoping that a safety management system approach can replace well founded expert 
judgement in dynamic situations.  The policy will need to address what expertise is needed and who has 
been selected. For example, Shanteau (1992) defined experts are “those who have been recognized within 
their profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the highest level”.  Evidence of 
appropriate qualifications or training may be necessary, where this is possible.   
Other cases may be more complex – for example designing activities to address a number of challenges 
together, such as marrying educational and health benefits of outdoor activities so that children learn to 
develop self-confidence and improve their own ability to handle risk and danger in the future.  Safety is 
only one component of the calculation and other expertise is required, which may not directly relate to a 
qualification. So perhaps a more pragmatic identification of expertise might be needed.  For example, 
Kahneman and Klein (2009) used an analogy within the domain of fire-fighting to provide a definition that 
relates to other levels of expertise in order to identify a person that has greater knowledge and so define 
an expert in the sense that when colleagues say, “If Person X had been there instead of Person Y, the fire 
would not have spread so far,” then Person X is an expert in that organization.  Both those approaches 
identify somebody that is better able than a novice to manage the situation and permit a judgement to be 
made about their role and extent of responsibility.  Thus one could see a plan for a school adventure sports 
trip being a product of the joint effort of experienced teachers allied to qualified instructors or guides at the 
site.  The risk manager therefore has a role in identifying the important components of an issue, especially 
the different objectives, benefits and agendas being pursued by various parties and seeking the relevant 
expertise to address gaps in the knowledge required for successful management. 
Other urban risk situations can easily be envisaged where there is great uncertainty (and so appropriate 
expertise is low) or ambiguity (public disagreement about the acceptability or otherwise based on value 
judgements other than riskiness).  Risk managers should thus initiate a broader stakeholder (societal) 
discourse to enable participative decision making.  Development of stakeholder consultation groups such as 
the Play Safety Forum or the National Tree Safety Group has been immensely useful in focusing debate on 
the wider issues involved but also in the provision of useful benchmarks against which others can evaluate 
the reasonableness of their intended actions. Such documents are known to be valued by regulators and 
the courts and can themselves help to address risk aversion built on apprehension over possible punitive 
action by engendering a sense of a common approach developed by a like-minded community.  Documents 
such as ‘Common sense risk management of trees’ (NTSG, 2016) and the position statement and guidance 
documents of the Play Safety Forum (PSF, 2002; 2006; 2012 and 2014), advocate inclusion of benefits other 
than increased safety in the calculation of the suitability of an intervention. 
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5. Conclusions 
Over the last few decades expertise in risk and safety has quite frequently come under attack, whether 
from the public who are increasingly less intimidated by science, by regulatory regimes that focus on the 
development of systems rather than judgements or from budgetary constraints.  Expertise is, of course, 
expensive and it certainly does not provide all the answers.  Sometimes an over-focus on evidence based 
approaches has brought its own difficulties and risk management has needed to re-focus on values.  On the 
other hand there are situations where a relativist view that science (or other knowledge) is simply 
somebody’s opinion and that dissenters are entirely justified in their objection because they do not happen 
to share it, is simply dangerous.  An approach to evaluating what expertise is appropriate based on 
consideration of some important characteristics of different types of risk has been presented.  It is 
important to identify the correct expertise, to deploy it effectively, and to support it with necessary 
resources. 
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